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Competition for firms in
an oligopolistic industry: the impact of economic integration |
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Andreas Haufler, Ian Wooton |
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Journal of international economics 80 (2010) p239-248 |
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This
paper set up a model of generalized oligopoly where two countries of
different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical
firms owned by residents of a third country. Their model features location
rents for firms that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium. This is because,
in the presence of trade costs, firms want to set up in different locations
from one another in order to reduce the competitive pressures that they face
and increase gross profits. This gives the host governments an opportunity to
grab these rents through taxes. On the other hand, the governments want to
attract firms to their jurisdiction as consumers prefer locally produced
goods to imports. Local production is cheaper than importing goods and hence
consumer prices are lower, and consumer surplus higher, when goods are made
in the domestic market. This makes governments willing to subsidies inward foreign
direct investment. The tax policies in their model thus derive from the
combination of these two counteracting forces. This paper find a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium tax rates and trade costs. Tax rates in both countries decline in the initial stages of economic integration but rise again when trade costs fall further. There is a range of trade costs where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country. This indicates that, at some stages of economic integration, there may indeed be conflicting interests between large and small countries with respect to continuing the process of market integration. |
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