研討日期

研討日期	2010年06月5日11:30 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院26教室
題目	Licensing Contract in a Stackelberg Model
作者	Luigi Filippini
文獻出處	The Manchester School(2005)
報告人	施姵全
參加人員	黃鴻、彭正浩、蔡明芳、曾靜枝、王羿傑、曹古拘、莊復賢、王佳琪、劉亮君、徐靖、涂光億、張民忠、林晏如、鐘暳陵、施姵全、丁虹仁
摘要	In this paper, we study optimal linear licensing and its social welfare implications when the innovator (patentee) is an insider that can make capacity/output commitment so as to act as a Stackelberg leader in the output market. The findings are: (i) The patentee’s profit-maximizing licensing contract is a royalty. (ii) The optimal royalty rate is greater than the cost reduction attained by the licensed technology and is increasing in the number of competitors. (iii) Optimal licensing maximizes the likelihood of technology transfer, may reduce social welfare and always makes consumers worse off. (iv) The innovator benefits from capacity commitment, and the more competitive the output market, the greater the gains it makes by licensing.
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