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International Outsourcing, Tax and Patent Protection |
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Dinda, S. and A. Mukherjee |
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Journal of Public Economic Theory(2010) |
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This paper shows that, in the
case of a vertical technology transfer, if there is imperfect knowledge
spillover under a weak patent protection, the strong patent protection in the
developing country increases the profit of the developed-country firm if
there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. If there is either
perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or the developing
country charges discriminatory tax rates, the profits of the developed-country
firms are the same under weak and strong patent protections in the developing
countries. |
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