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International Outsourcing, Tax and Patent Protection

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Dinda, S. and A. Mukherjee

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Journal of Public Economic Theory(2010)

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This paper shows that, in the case of a vertical technology transfer, if there is imperfect knowledge spillover under a weak patent protection, the strong patent protection in the developing country increases the profit of the developed-country firm if there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. If there is either perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or the developing country charges discriminatory tax rates, the profits of the developed-country firms are the same under weak and strong patent protections in the developing countries.

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