研討日期

2010年5月22日10:20 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

題目

Entry, Licensing and Research Joint Ventures

 

作者

Sang-Seung Yi

 

文獻出處

International Journal of Industrial Organization 17 (1999) 1-24

報告人

周冰瑤

參加人員

梁文榮、蔡明芳、吳芝文、高國峯、周品旭、張民忠、曾靜枝、張瑞雲、周冰瑤、王羿傑、林晏如、吳宜謙、涂光億、王佳琪、徐奭驊、

施姵全、丁虹仁

摘要

The existing literature does not deal with the incentives of the technological followers to cooperate with each other in the presence of a dominant technological leader. This paper considers an incumbent monopolist faced with potential competitors who can enter the market by developing a substitute, but inferior, technology. What is the incumbent’s optimal licensing policy? When, to whom, and under what conditions should the incumbent firm license its superior technology? Can the incumbent firm reduce the threat of entry by using its licensing policy strategically? If so, can the potential entrants counter the incumbent’s strategic use of licensing by forming a research joint venture among themselves? The main findings of the current paper are (1) the incumbent refuses to enter into an ex-ante licensing agreement, but, after development of an imitation technology occurs, finds it optimal to license the strong rival exclusively; (2) but the incumbent’s credible threat of licensing the unsuccessful entrant reduces the potential entrants’ ex-ante incentives to invest in developing the alternative technology; and (3) the incumbent’s strategic use of licensing makes the formation of a research joint venture more attractive to the potential entrants.

 

 

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