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Input Price Discrimination, Market
Structure and Social Welfare |
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Kuo-Feng Kao and Cheng-Hau Peng |
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Working Paper |
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Cheng-Hau
Peng |
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In considering the structural change in the
final good market, this paper re-examines the welfare implications of input
price discrimination in vertically-related markets. We have found that
discriminatory pricing may be superior to uniform pricing in terms of welfare
if there are new downstream firms to be served under discriminatory pricing.
However, this result cannot always be true. If the marginal cost difference
becomes large but non-drastic, the new entrants are too inefficient, allowing
price discrimination may lower social welfare. Therefore, the social welfare
under monopoly may be higher than that under duopoly. It implies that the
social welfare of price discrimination does not only depend on the structure
of the downstream market, the marginal cost difference also plays an
important role. Moreover, the fixed costs of the downstream firms should be
considered as well. |
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