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Welfare Implications of Third-degree Price Discrimination in Input Markets |
Chin-Sheng Chen and Hong Hwang |
Working paper |
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This paper investigates the welfare effects of
price discrimination in input markets with a model of competition between
chain stores and local firms. In a benchmark where the chain store has
integrated backward, we have found that, with a general cost structure in the
final good industry, the input monopolist if adopts discriminatory pricing
may charge a more efficient local firm a lower input price. Moreover, without
changing the total output of the final good, the price discrimination
resulting in higher consumption benefits of final good can enhance social
welfare even if production efficiency is getting worse off at the same time.
This consequence is also valid when the chain store is not integrated. |