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Excess Entry Theorem: The Implications of Licensing |
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Arjit Mukherjee & Soma
Mukherjee |
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The Manchester School(2008) |
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In this paper, we show that, in the presence of technology licensing, entry in an industry
with Cournot competition may lead to a socially insufficient, number of firms.
Insufficient entry occurs if the own marginal cost of the entrant
is sufficiently high. If the own marginal cost of the entrant is very low, licensing may create excessive entry for those entry
costs where entry does not
occur without licensing; thus licensing reduces social welfare though it increases competition. |
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