研討日期

2010年4月17日10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院23教室

題目

Strategic Voting in Open Primary

作者

K.P. Chen and S. Z.Yang

文獻出處

Public Choice, 1-30, 2002

報告人

許淑媖

參加人員

黃鴻    梁文榮    王光正    林燕淑    王羿傑    高國峰    許淑媖    張瑞雲    彭正浩    涂光億    丁虹仁    林晏如    鐘嘒陵    蔡明芳    陳金盛    施姵全    褚泓毅

摘要

The purpose of an open primary is to incorporate more moderate votes into the primary elections. This intention may backfire when nonparty members strategically participate in the primary, and the result of an open primary might become even more extreme than when non party members are not allowed to participate. Realizing this, the party members might also vote strategically to counter-react. If this occurs, then it might actually coordinate the votes of the party's supporters. The effect of strategic voting behavior on the result of a primary depends on the size of the party, turnout rate of nonparty members, the positions of the candidates and the proportion of voters who vote strategically. Strategic voting behavior can sometimes improve social welfare.

備註