研討日期

2010年4月10日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第26教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Recycling Target Policies and R&D Cooperation in an Imperfect Competition Market

Satoshi, Honma

Ming-Chung, Chang

Discussion Paper

報告人

張民忠

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、吳芝文、王光正、彭正浩、高國峰、林晏如、張瑞雲、王佳琪、張民忠、曾靜枝、施姵全、蔡明芳、鐘嘒陵、丁虹仁、涂光億、周冰瑤、陳金盛

論文提要

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue the government’s recycling target rate.  This ideal stems form the Japan’s Recycling Law and Japan’s resources recycling market.  We employ three kinds of two-stage game models to analyze this issue:  non-cooperative model, firm-wide cooperative model, and within-firm cooperative model.  In stage 0, the government sets a recycling target rate.  In stage 1, two firms simultaneously decide R&D investment level.  In stage 2, two firms engage in a Cournot competition.  We conclude that the social welfare in the within-firm cooperative model is higher (lower) than that in the firm-wide cooperative model when the recycling target rate is low (high).  Besides, the government should set a recycling rate is higher than 50% when the marginal environment damage is large.  Finally, we suggest that the Japan government should encourage firms to do a join-adventure in R&D since it will create a higher social welfare than that in current resources recycling market.

研究建議

1.      與R&D相關的文獻非常多且做得非常深入，本文可以參考相關文獻進行更深入的研究。

2.      本文可檢視若沒有汙染的情況下，是否會reduce到傳統的R&D模型。

3.      數值分析的部份最好不要，試著使用隱函數的方式進行分析。

4.      回收的原料是否比較昂貴，最好有實例佐證。

備註