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Input Price Discrimination under Returns to Scale

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Kuo-Feng Kao and Hong Hwang

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Working Paper

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Kuo-Feng Kao (°ª°ê峯)

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In the traditional literature, the basic assumption that one unit of input produces one unit of output has already be a common setting in vertically related markets. However, it may not always be true among industries since the production technology is different. Therefore, the one to one correspondent production technology should be revised. In this paper, we examine the welfare effect of price discrimination under returns to scale in a vertically related market with one upstream monopolist and two downstream duopolists. We found that when the production technology is constant returns to scale or increasing returns to scale, prohibiting input price discrimination can raise social welfare. However, when the production technology is enough decreasing returns to scale, the upstream monopolist may charge the highly (less) efficient firm a lower (higher) input price. That improves the production efficiency and therefore, the social welfare. Moreover, we show that even if the final outputs are lower under discriminatory pricing, the social welfare can still be higher.

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