研討日期	2010年03月27日上午10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台灣大學社會科學院 法26教室
討論文獻	題目	作者	文獻出處
	Welfare reducing licensing	Ramon Faulí-Oller and Joel Sandonís	GAMES and Economic Behavior
報告人	王羿傑
參加人員	梁文榮 吳芝文 王佳琪 王羿傑 周冰瑤 鍾慧陵 許淑瑛 彭正浩 蔡明芳 高國峰 陳金盛 涂光億 施姵全 丁虹仁 褚泓毅
論文提要	In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare.We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.
備註	1.The intuition for the main result must be considered again. In particular, authors show that for low values of c and γ licensing is welfare improving. However, members of workshop suggest that figure 1 explains the intuition of welfare directly.