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研討日期 |
2010年03月27日
10:20 ~ |
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研討地點 |
台灣大學社會科學院 第26教室 |
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討論題目 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
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Rivalry
between strategic alliances |
Anming Zhang and Yimin Zhang |
International Journal of
Industrial Organization 24 (2006) 287-301 |
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報告人 |
鍾暳陵 |
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參加人員 |
梁文榮 吳芝文 王佳琪 王羿傑 周冰瑤 鍾暳陵 許淑媖 彭正浩 蔡明芳 高國峰 陳金盛 涂光億 施姵全 丁虹仁 褚泓毅 |
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討論提要 |
A strategic alliance might be viewed as
a lesser form of a merger. While merger activities have slowed down
significantly since 2000, strategic alliances are increasingly, and widely,
used by firms. In this paper, we investigate the issue of strategic alliances
and alliance rivalry—where each alliance member maximizes its own profit and
some share of its partner’s profit—in the context of both within-alliance and
cross-alliance interactions. Our second objective is to investigate whether
strategic alliances should be viewed as causes for anticompetitive concerns.
We examine a complementary alliance in which two firms link up their
complementary products in the context of competing strategic alliances. |
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討論結果與建議 |
A complementary alliance confers a strategic
advantage by allowing the partners to credibly commit to greater output,
owing to both within-alliance complementarities and cross-alliance substitutabilities. Although rivalry between different alliances
can sometimes lead to a Prisoners’ Dilemma for firms, it tends to improve
economic welfare. On the other hand, an alliance that arises due purely to
the threat of entry may reduce welfare. 延伸 將此篇互相持股的策略聯盟設定方式用於搭售的議題上。設定一個三階段的賽局分析，第一階段為兩聯盟廠商同時決定持股比例；第二階段為兩聯盟廠商同時決定是否搭售，並於搭售下同時決定折扣金額；第三階段為四家廠商各自決定產品訂價。 |
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備註 |
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