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Free Entry and Social Inefficiency |
N. Gregory Mankiw and Michael D.
Whinston |
The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1986) |
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Previous articles have noted the possibility of
socially inefficient levels of entry in markets in which firms must incur fixed
set-up costs upon entry. This article identifies the fundamental and
intuitive forces that lie behind these entry biases. If an entrant causes
incumbent firms to reduce output, entry is more desirable to the entrant than
it is to society. There is therefore a tendency toward excessive entry in
homogeneous product markets. The roles of product diversity and the integer
constraint on the number of firms are also examined. |