研討日期

2010年3月6日10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

題目

Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilirbia in a differentiated duopoly with product R&D

作者

George Symeonidis

文獻出處

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, 21,p39-55

報告人

林晏如

參加人員

黃鴻    梁文榮    陳宏易    王羿傑    蔡明芳    涂光億    曾靜枝    陳金盛    彭正浩    王佳琪    丁虹仁    王光正    高國峯    褚泓毅    林晏如    周冰瑤    張瑞雲    鐘嘒陵    張民忠    施姵全

摘要

This paper compares Bertrad and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. Firms invest in R&D in order to enhance product quality. Quality increases the consumers’ willingness to pay for the firm’s variety, but it comes at a cost. The competition in the industry is described by a two-stage game. At stage 1 each firm chooses a variety. At stage 2 the firms set quantities or prices. This paper find that R&D expenditure, prices and firms’ net profits are always higher under quantity competition than under price competition. Further more, if R&D spillover are strong and products are not too differentiated, then output, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower in the Bertrand case than in the Cournot case.

備註

在本文中, R&D的外溢效果參數是模型設定的關鍵，當外溢效果不夠大時，則Cournot競爭下的社會福利較Bertrand競爭高的結果可能不存在。