研討日期

2010年2月27日10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

題目

The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: A reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining

作者

Monica Correa Lopez, Robin A. Naylor

文獻出處

European Economic Review,48, 681-696, 2004

報告人

曾靜枝

參加人員

梁文榮    陳宏易    吳芝文    林燕淑    高國峯    蔡明芳    王佳琪    王羿傑    褚泓毅    張民忠    賴慧珊    彭正浩    曾靜枝    林晏如    陳金盛    涂光億    丁虹仁    施姵全

摘要

This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labor union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition – when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes – is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences and on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function.

備註

Cournot 競爭與 Bertrand 競爭的利潤反轉結果，已經有許多既有文獻可得此一結果。而本文證明此一結果必須在非常特殊情況下才會成立，似乎比較不有趣。若Cournot 與 Bertrand 兩者競爭型態之間的價格差異、福利差異也可以得到反轉的結果，會更加有趣。