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研討日期 |
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研討地點 |
台灣大學社會科學院 法26教室 |
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討論文獻 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
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Risk sharing in licensing |
Alain Bousquet, Helmuth Cremer*, Marc Ivaldi, Michel Wolkowicz |
International Journal of
Industrial Organization |
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報告人 |
王羿傑 |
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參加人員 |
黃鴻
梁文榮 王光正 蔡明芳 高國騟 王羿傑 褚泓毅 林燕淑 周冰瑤 彭正浩 張民忠 鐘嘒陵 施姵全 |
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論文提要 |
This paper studies the
design of linear license contracts under demand or cost uncertainty. The
optimal contract consists, in general, of a mix of a fixed fee and royalties. The source of uncertainty
has a crucial impact on the type of royalties that must be used. In
particular, under demand uncertainty at most two of the instruments are used.
The contract generally combines a fixed fee with an ad valorem royalty. When
cost is uncertain, a wider variety of cases can arise. The contract may
involve a combination of either type of royalties, coupled with a fixed fee.
Alternatively, it may be optimal to use all three available instruments. |
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備註 |
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