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研討日期 |
2010年02月20日
10:20 ~ |
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研討地點 |
台灣大學社會科學院 第26教室 |
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討論題目 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
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Exclusionary
Bundling –
The motive for mergers |
Sue H. Mialon |
Working paper (2010) |
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報告人 |
鍾暳陵 |
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參加人員 |
黃鴻 梁文榮 王光正 蔡明芳 高國峰 王羿傑 褚泓毅 林燕淑 周冰瑤 彭正浩 張民忠 鍾暳陵 施姵全 |
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討論提要 |
In 2001, the European Commission (EC) blocked
the $42 billion merger between GE and Honeywell, which had been approved
earlier by US antitrust authorities. The primary reason to block the merger
was that it would facilitate the bundling of aircraft engines and systems to
which competitors would not be able to effectively respond. This paper models how
exclusionary bundling motivates mergers. |
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討論結果與建議 |
Firms in two unrelated markets may want to merge only to bundle, even
though bundling is possible without a merger. This is because merger is
necessary in order to use bundling for an exclusionary purpose. Independently
of a merger, firms can always improve their profits from pure bundling. In
contrast, a merger is never profitable if not combined with bundling. Moreover,
it is more profitable to bundle through strategic alliance than through
merger in the short run. Thus, firms choose to merge only if the merger can
lead to foreclosure. Although the merger results in losses to a rival in only
one of the two markets, foreclosure occurs in both markets, since the other
rival firm alone cannot compete against a bundle. 延伸 設定一個具有彈性的市場需求，分別討論垂直或水平方式的合併及策略聯盟，廠商的最適結盟方式。並以反托拉斯的立場，判定是否應阻止其結盟行為。 |
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備註 |
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