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Input Price Discrimination, Market
Structure and Social Welfare |
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Kuo-Feng Kao and Cheng-Hau Peng |
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Working Paper |
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Cheng-Hau
Peng |
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Considering
the structural change of the final good market, this paper re-examines the
welfare implication of input price discrimination in the vertically related
markets. We assume that in exercising its monopoly power, the upstream monopolist
can select either a uniform or a discriminatory pricing. We have found that, in the short run,
discriminatory pricing is superior (inferior) to uniform pricing in terms of
welfare if the marginal cost differentiation between the two downstream firms
is moderate (small). In the long run, the welfare ranking of the two pricing
regimes is contingent on the dynamic efficiencies of the two downstream
firms. The welfare is the same under both pricing schemes as the marginal cost
differentiation is large or the dynamic efficiency is high. |
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