研討日期

2010年01月02日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   第26教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

To merge or to license:
implications for competition policy

Ramon Fauli-Oller

and

 Joel Sandonis

(2003)

International Journal of Industrial Organization

報告人

陳佩鈴

參加人員

黃  鴻    梁文榮    王光正    高國騟    陳宏易    黃瑞萌    蔡明芳    王羿傑   

陳佩鈴    林晏如    彭正浩    施姵全    丁虹仁    陳金盛    張民忠

論文提要

    The optimal competition policy when licensing is an alternative to a merger to transfer a superior technology is derived in a differentiated goods duopoly, for the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition.  We  show that whenever both royalties and fixed fees are feasible, mergers should not be allowed, which fits the prescription of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  By contrast, when only one instrument is feasible, be it fixed fees or royalties, the possibility of licensing cannot be used as a definitive argument against mergers.

研究建議

An interesting extension of the paper would be to design not only the optimal merger policy but a more general competition policy, in the sense that it also allows us to prescribe whether licensing should be allowed or not.