研討日期

2009年11月21日10:10 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Market power, price discrimination, and allocative efficiency in intermediate-goods markets

Roman Inderst

and

Greg Shaffer

RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 2009 pp. 658–672

報告人

陳金盛

參加人員

黃鴻、彭正浩、吳芝文、張瑞雲、高國峯、吳世傑、王佳琪、陳佩鈴、蔡明芳、林晏如、張民忠、李朝功、周品旭、吳宜謙、丁虹仁、陳金盛、施姵全

摘要

This paper considers a monopolistic supplier’s optimal choice of two-part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms’ competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.