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Multinational firms, exclusivity, and backward linkages

Ping Lin , Kamal Saggi

Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 206¡V220 

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How does the nature of contractual relationships between a multinational and its local suppliers affect backward linkages andwelfare in the local industry?We address this question in a two-tier oligopolymodel where a multinational  transfers technology to its suppliers if they accept an exclusive contract that precludes themfromserving its local rivals.

Invited suppliers balance the benefits of gaining access to newtechnology and the derived demand of the multinational against the opportunity of selling to other local firms. Exclusivity reduces competition among local suppliers and can lower backward linkages and local welfare relative to autarky

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