研討日期

2009年10月03日  10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   電化教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Paying for loyalty: Product bundling in oligopoly

Joshua S. Gans and Stephen P. King

Journal of Industrial Economics Vol.LIV, NO.1, March 2006 pp.43-62

報告人

鍾暳陵

參加人員

黃鴻 吳芝文 彭正浩 周冰瑤 周品旭 吳宜謙 林晏如 丁虹仁 曾靜枝 陳金盛 高國峯 施姵全 鍾暳陵 張瑞雲 王佳琪 張民忠

討論提要

    Firms in oligopolistic environments encouraging customer loyalty by offering interlocking discounts between particular brands of seemingly unrelated products. The bundled discount represents an ex ante commitment to the price for customer loyalty. This paper model the interaction between four producers of two products to investigate the consequences of bundled discounts in an oligopoly setting.   

討論結果與建議

By creating an externality in pricing between otherwise unrelated firms, bundling allows firms to alter the intensity of price competition. If only one pair of independent firms sets a bundled discount then it gains a strategic advantage through price discrimination. Unilateral bundling is profitable in this situation as the increase in the intensity of competition is muted by the coordination failure. While the co-Branded firms increase profits, both the profits of the other firms and social welfare fall.

 

延伸

本文假設消費者的需求為單一彈性，可沿用 Economides and Salop (1992) 進一步將需求放寬為有彈性的需求，分析搭售對廠商提供折扣的影響

備註