研討日期

2009年9月26日10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

題目

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

作者

George Symeonidis

文獻出處

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,17, 247-270, 2008

報告人

曾靜枝

參加人員

姚仁德、康廷嶽、林燕淑、吳世傑、陳宏易、蔡明芳、梁文榮、曾靜枝、許淑媖、王羿傑、高國峯、陳佩玲、彭正浩、吳宜謙、周品旭、鍾暳陵、陳金盛、施姵全、丁虹仁、李朝功

摘要

This paper analyzes the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a s whole.

備註