研討日期	2009年9月12日上午10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台灣大學社會科學院 電化教室
討論文獻	題目	作者	文獻出處
	Tariffs and Quotas Equivalence under Vertically Related Markets.	Hong Hwang, Kuo-Feng Kao Cheng-Hau Peng	Working Paper
報告人	蔡明芳
參加人員	黃鴻 梁文榮 林燕淑 康廷嶽 林晏如 曾靜枝 涂光億 王光正 吳芝文 彭正浩 張瑞雲 陳金盛 施姵全 陳宏易 張民忠 王佳琪 鐘嘒陵 丁虹仁 蔡明芳 吳宜謙 陳佩鈴 王羿傑
論文提要	This paper re-examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross-haul within each other’s market. We assume that in exercising its monopoly power, the upstream monopolist can select either a two-part or a one-part tariff pricing strategy; we subsequently go on to demonstrate that the pricing strategy of the upstream firm is crucial to tariff and quota equivalence. Specifically, if the upstream firm adopts a two-part (one-part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff regime will be higher (lower) than that under the equivalent quota regime; that is to say, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988) and Fung (1989). We also compare social welfare under the two regimes, wherein the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, or where there is a zero tariff (i.e., a ‘special case’ scenario in which free trade prevails) and the quota is just binding at the free trade import level. Surprisingly, the social welfare under a tariff regime (or the free trade regime as a special case) will necessarily be lower than that under the equivalent quota regime. This is mainly attributable to the upstream firm charging a higher input price under a tariff regime than under the equivalent quota regime.
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