研討日期

2009年9月5日10:10 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Welfare Implications of Price Discrimination in Input Markets

Hong Hwang

and

Chin-Sheng Chen

 

Working Paper

報告人

陳金盛

參加人員

黃鴻、康廷嶽、彭正浩、蔡明芳、張瑞雲、曾靜枝、王佳琪、陳宏易、

高國峯、涂光億、林晏如、李朝功、周品旭 、丁虹仁、陳金盛、鐘嘒陵、

吳宜謙

摘要

 This paper analyzes the price decision of an input monopolist who serves local firms that compete with a backward integrated chain store in the respective final good market. The input monopolist can choose either third-degree discriminatory pricing or uniform pricing. We compare the input price and the level of social welfare between the two pricing schemes. By setting a more general cost structure in the final good industry, we have found that the input monopolist if adopts discriminatory pricing may charge a more efficient local firm for a lower input price. This result runs contrary to that made by Katz (1985) and Yoshida (2000), Moreover, price discrimination in the input market does not change the total output of the final good, but it can enhance social welfare due to its more uniform distribution of outputs in the final good markets. This result is different from that in Schmalensee (1981) who proves that price discrimination is welfare-improving only if it can raise total output. Therefore, the policy implication of price discrimination in input markets is quite different from that in final good markets.