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Decision Mechanism, Quality Policy and Competition Mode

Su-Ying Hsu and Hong Hwand

Working Paper

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Product safety is receiving widespread attentions as a series of products jeopardize people¡¦s life. Institutional changes often take place in accompany with a country¡¦s economic development. We attempt to investigate the effects of different decision mechanisms on a country¡¦s policy. How policies are affected if the firms engaged in different nature of competition. From the theoretical point of view, it is still not precisely obvious how an industrial policy varies with different decision mechanisms.

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This paper proposes a partial equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation to compare minimum quality standard (MQS) under social welfare maximization and referendum. Optimal MQS is the highest among the decision mechanisms no matter the firms engage in either Bertrand or Cournot competition. Moreover, the MQS is higher under social welfare maximization than under laisser-faire when firms engage in Bertrand competition, but the ranking is reversed when firms engage in Cournot competition.

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