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研討日期 |
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研討地點 |
台大社會科學院電化教室 |
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題目 |
Upstream Price Discrimination in the Presence of Licensing |
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作者 |
Hong Hwang and Kuo-Feng Kao |
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文獻出處 |
Working Paper |
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報告人 |
Kuo-Feng Kao |
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參加人員 |
黃鴻、趙志鉅、林燕淑、陳宏易、曾靜枝、涂光億、蔡明芳、彭正浩、陳佩玲、丁虹仁、鍾暳陵、林大鈞、周冰瑤、王佳琪、陳金盛、張民忠、高國峯 |
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摘要 |
Licensing is a common industrial behavior nowadays. In this paper, we examine the welfare effect of price discrimination in the presence of fixed-fee licensing in a vertically related market with one upstream monopolist and n downstream oligopolists. It is found that weather allowing price discrimination or not may significantly change the licensing behavior of an innovator. If the upstream monopolist is not allowed to price discriminate on the downstream firms, the innovator would license to fewer firms to restrain the rent extracted by the upstream firm and intensify the cost-saving effect. In contrast, if the monopolist is allowed to price discriminate, the incentive no longer exists since the input price is unaffected by the number of licenses. This implies that price discrimination of the upstream monopolist may raise social welfare as long as the efficiency gain from more licenses dominates the efficiency loss from input markets. However, if only the input supplier is a foreign firm, allowing price discrimination causes damage to social welfare. |
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備註 |
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