研討日期

2009年7月11日10:10 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Vertical Integration and Exports with Successive

Oligopoly

 

Chin-Sheng Chen

and

Hong Hwang

 

Working Paper

報告人

陳金盛

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、高國峯、張志偉、翁子昂、康廷嶽、曾靜枝、彭正浩 、鍾嘒陵、丁虹仁、陳金盛、李朝功 、周品旭、吳宜謙、林晏如、蔡明芳 、王冠文

討論提要

  Salinger (1988, QJE) derives the relationship between the number of vertically-integrated firms and total output. His study also indicates that if the total output of the final good increases after vertical integration, the social welfare will also increase. In this paper, we employ a similar model, but assume that the output of the final goods is for export in order to re-examine the welfare implications of vertical integration and compare them with those derived by Salinger (1988). In addition, this paper separately examines the effects of vertical integration if there are foreign firms competing with domestic firms in the foreign market or the domestic firms are also serving in the domestic market.

結論

    This paper has employed a successive oligopoly model to examine how domestic exports change as vertical integration arises as well as what is the relationship between the changes in exports and social welfare. These are studied in a basic model, in which all the domestic final good production is sold in the foreign market, as well as in a model with extensions that consider foreign rivalry in the foreign market and domestic consumption. It is found that, in the basic model, the change in the market price of the intermediate good is crucial in determining the change in the equilibrium output in an export-oriented industry. It is shown that the volume of exports is reduced with vertical integration as the intermediate good price rises and some sufficient conditions hold.

 

Regarding the policy implications, in our model we consider a marginal change in the number of vertically-integrated firms in investigating its influence on social welfare, and then determine its policy effect in a trade environment. It is shown that by encouraging the domestic firms to engage in vertical integration or by discouraging them from it and reducing domestic exports, the government can then enhance social welfare. As some trade policies such as export subsidies are these days increasingly being restricted by the WTO, our findings in this paper provide a novel perspective regarding the application of strategic trade policy in the literature.