研討日期	2009年7月11日
研討地點	台灣大學社會科學院電化教室（台北市徐州路21號）
題目	Strategic policy for product R&D with symmetric costs
作者	Naoto Jinji
文獻出處	Canadian Journal of Economics Vol.36 No.4 p993-1006
報告人	林晏如
參加人員	黃鴻梁文榮林燕淑高國峰騟張志偉翁子昂康廷嶽曾靜枝彭正浩鍾嘒陵丁虹仁陳金盛李朝功周品旭吳宜謙林晏如蔡明芳王冠文
摘要	There are many examples of governments using policy to affect R&D. Why do the governments have an incentive to use policies targeted at R&D in high-technology industries? In the strategic trade policy literature, Spencer and Brander (1983) show that the government has a unilateral incentive to subsidize R&D. The R&D in their case is aimed at reducing production costs, which is called process R&D. In this paper, she examine strategic policy for product R&D when firms have access to the same technology. She use a vertically differentiated duopoloy of a third-market model. The model is three-stage. In stage 1 the policy-active government(s) (simultaneously) set(s) R&D policy; in stage 2 firms simultaneously choose the quality of their products; and in stage 3 firms compete in either prices or quantities. The main results are as follows. Unlike Spencer and Brander (1983), the unilateral policy is not a uniform subsidy. It takes a form of subsidy schedule that is contingent on firms’quality choices, involving various subsidy rates. While the government commits to the subsidy schedule in stage 1 of the game, the actual subsidy rate is determined when firms choose their product qualities in stage 2. Since there exist multiple equilibria, the strategic policy not only confers a strategic advantage on the domestic firm but also makes the preferred equilibrium unieque. The unilateral policy enables the firm in the policy-active country to produce a high quality product. Moreover, when the two governments are active, in equilibrium the two governments implement different subsidy schedules. There are two equilibrium outcomes that identical except for the identity of the countries. Each country has an equal chance to become the high-quality exporter.