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Technology Licensing on Quality:  An Outside Innovator Case

 

Working Paper

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This paper studies the technology licensing of a quality innovation form an outside innovator to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly that has different product quality.  We find that two-part tariff licensing is superior to the fixed-fee licensing when the outside innovator has a high quality innovation.

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1.      ³Ì¦n±q¼Ò«¬¤ÀªR¤¤§ä¥X±ÂÅv®ÄªG(licensing effect)»P¥«³õÄvª§(market competition effect)¨â­Ó®ÄªG¡A¥Ñ³o¨â­Ó®ÄªG¶i¦æ¸gÀÙ·N¸qªº¤ÀªR¡C

2.      »P¹L¥h¤åÄm¤ñ¸ûªº³¡¥÷¡A¦]¸Ó½T¹ê´x´¤¥»¤å¼Ò«¬»P¹L¥h¤åÄm¼Ò«¬ªº®t²§¦Ó«á¦A°µ¤ñ¸û¡C

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4.      ¥»¤å¤¤¡A­Y±ÂÅv«´¬ù¬°two-part tariff licensing¡A¦¹®ÉÀ³¸Ó»Pfixed-fee licensing¥H¤Îroyalty licensing¬Û¤ñ¸û¡A§ä¥X³Ì¾Aªº±ÂÅv¼Ò¦¡¡C

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