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Technology Licensing on Quality: An Outside Innovator Case |
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This paper studies the technology licensing of a quality
innovation form an outside innovator to an asymmetric Cournot
duopoly that has different product quality. We find that two-part tariff licensing
is superior to the fixed-fee licensing when the outside innovator has a high
quality innovation. |
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1. ³Ì¦n±q¼Ò«¬¤ÀªR¤¤§ä¥X±ÂÅv®ÄªG(licensing effect)»P¥«³õÄvª§(market competition
effect)¨âӮĪG¡A¥Ñ³o¨âӮĪG¶i¦æ¸gÀÙ·N¸qªº¤ÀªR¡C 2. »P¹L¥h¤åÄm¤ñ¸ûªº³¡¥÷¡A¦]¸Ó½T¹ê´x´¤¥»¤å¼Ò«¬»P¹L¥h¤åÄm¼Ò«¬ªº®t²§¦Ó«á¦A°µ¤ñ¸û¡C 3. ¥¼¨Ó¼Ò«¬¥iÂX®i¨ì»ù®æÄvª§¤ÀªR¡C 4. ¥»¤å¤¤¡AY±ÂÅv«´¬ù¬°two-part tariff licensing¡A¦¹®ÉÀ³¸Ó»Pfixed-fee licensing¥H¤Îroyalty licensing¬Û¤ñ¸û¡A§ä¥X³Ì¾Aªº±ÂÅv¼Ò¦¡¡C |
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