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Mergers with bundling in complementary markets

Jay Pil Choi

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, pp.553-577

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This paper develops a simple model to analyze the effects of mergers in complementary system markets when the merged firm is able to engage in bundling. He analyze the impact of (mixed) bundling on pricing decisions for existing generations of products and derive welfare implications of mergers. The basic model is then extended to analyze industry dynamics where the implications of mergers for innovation incentives and technical tying/

compatibility decisions, the possibility of counter-merger, derive implications of the policy prescription that prohibits bundling as a condition for merger.

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Conclusion:

(1)   The price of the bundle post-merger is lower than the sum of the pre-merger component prices.

(2)   The merged firm¡¦s prices for individual components are higher with mixed bundling.

(3)   The independent firms also cut their prices. However, the sum of there two prices are higher than the bundle price and the composite prices of the mix-and-match systems increase.

(4)   In the absence of foreclosure, the effect of the merger with mixed bundling on social welfare is negative if the cross-price elasticity is very high.

Extension:

(1)   The independent firms can adopt strategic alliance.

(2)   I can structure a model to analyze GE/Honeywell merger that had been approved by Washington has been blocked by European regulators.