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Mergers with bundling in complementary markets |
Jay Pil Choi |
Journal
of Industrial Economics, 2008, pp.553-577 |
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This paper develops a simple
model to analyze the effects of mergers in complementary system markets when
the merged firm is able to engage in bundling. He analyze the impact of
(mixed) bundling on pricing decisions for existing generations of products
and derive welfare implications of mergers. The basic model is then extended
to analyze industry dynamics where the implications of mergers for innovation
incentives and technical tying/ compatibility
decisions, the possibility of counter-merger, derive implications of the
policy prescription that prohibits bundling as a condition for merger. |
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Conclusion: (1)
The price of the bundle
post-merger is lower than the sum of the pre-merger component prices. (2) The merged firm¡¦s prices for individual components
are higher with mixed bundling. (3) The independent firms also cut their prices. However, the sum of
there two prices are higher than the bundle price and the composite prices of
the mix-and-match systems increase. (4) In the absence of foreclosure, the effect of the merger with
mixed bundling on social welfare is negative if the cross-price elasticity is
very high. Extension: (1)
The independent firms can adopt strategic alliance. (2)
I can structure a model to analyze GE/Honeywell merger that had been
approved by |