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The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development |
Changying Li Keith E. Maskus |
Journal of International Economics |
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We develop a two-country model of endogenous investment in process
innovation by a manufacturer facing competition from parallel imports (PI).
In a model of vertical price control we formalized the common intuition that
permitting PI reduces anticipated profits from process innovation. Our first
result is that profits depend on the cost of transporting PI goods. When the
transportation cost is small, the manufacturer raises its wholesale price in
order to control PI. However, a higher wholesale price increases the
distortion in the distributor's market and the net effect on the
manufacturer's profit could be negative. As transportation cost rises, the
manufacturer can offer a lower wholesale price to improve vertical pricing
efficiency. Where the transportation cost is high enough to prevent PI, the
manufacturer's profit achieves its maximum. Our second
result is that successful cost-reducing innovation is helpful in lowering the
wholesale price, thereby diminishing the vertical pricing distortion.
However, this in turn encourages more PI. The third outcome is that the
difference in profits between successful and failed innovation takes a
U-shape in terms of the cost of parallel trade. That is, the manufacturer's
incentive to engage in R&D first decreases as the cost of parallel trade rises,
then increases, and ultimately it remains constant. The final contribution of
this paper is to show that openness to parallel imports inhibits R&D. In
essence, by engaging in process innovation, the manufacturer achieves a
higher expected profit without parallel trade than with parallel trade. |
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