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The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development

Changying Li

Keith E. Maskus

Journal of International Economics

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We develop a two-country model of endogenous investment in process innovation by a manufacturer facing competition from parallel imports (PI). In a model of vertical price control we formalized the common intuition that permitting PI reduces anticipated profits from process innovation. Our first result is that profits depend on the cost of transporting PI goods. When the transportation cost is small, the manufacturer raises its wholesale price in order to control PI. However, a higher wholesale price increases the distortion in the distributor's market and the net effect on the manufacturer's profit could be negative. As transportation cost rises, the manufacturer can offer a lower wholesale price to improve vertical pricing efficiency. Where the transportation cost is high enough to prevent PI, the manufacturer's profit achieves its maximum. Our second result is that successful cost-reducing innovation is helpful in lowering the wholesale price, thereby diminishing the vertical pricing distortion. However, this in turn encourages more PI. The third outcome is that the difference in profits between successful and failed innovation takes a U-shape in terms of the cost of parallel trade. That is, the manufacturer's incentive to engage in R&D first decreases as the cost of parallel trade rises, then increases, and ultimately it remains constant. The final contribution of this paper is to show that openness to parallel imports inhibits R&D. In essence, by engaging in process innovation, the manufacturer achieves a higher expected profit without parallel trade than with parallel trade.

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