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Optimal Licensing Strategy: Royalty or Fixed Fee? |
Andrea Fosfuri and Esther Roca |
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2004, Vol. 3, No. 1, 13-19 |
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Licensing
a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to
licensing by means of a fixed fee for an incumbent licensor. This note shows
that this result relies crucially on the assumption that the incumbent
licensor can sell its cost-reducing innovation to all industry players. If,
for any reason, only some competitors could be reached through a licensing
contract, then a fixed fee might be optimally chosen. In a linear demand Cournot framework with
constant marginal production costs, we analyze the optimal two-part tariff
licensing contract for a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation. |
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This
note shows that, when the incumbent licensor cannot sell its cost-reducing
innovation to all industry players but only to some of them, a fixed fee
royalty might instead be optimally chosen. Indeed, the licensor has an
incentive to make its licensees more aggressive in the product market in
order to steal market share from other (non-licensee) rivals. In turn, this
implies reducing the unit royalty as much as possible. |