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Optimal Licensing Strategy: Royalty or Fixed Fee?

 

Andrea Fosfuri and Esther Roca

 

 

International Journal of Business and Economics, 2004, Vol. 3, No. 1, 13-19

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    Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by means of a fixed fee for an incumbent licensor. This note shows that this result relies crucially on the assumption that the incumbent licensor can sell its cost-reducing innovation to all industry players. If, for any reason, only some competitors could be reached through a licensing contract, then a fixed fee might be optimally chosen.

    In a linear demand Cournot framework with constant marginal production costs, we analyze the optimal two-part tariff licensing contract for a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation.

 

 

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    This note shows that, when the incumbent licensor cannot sell its cost-reducing innovation to all industry players but only to some of them, a fixed fee royalty might instead be optimally chosen. Indeed, the licensor has an incentive to make its licensees more aggressive in the product market in order to steal market share from other (non-licensee) rivals. In turn, this implies reducing the unit royalty as much as possible.