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War and Peace: A Model of Conflict with Endogenous Destruction

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Yang-Ming Chang

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Zijun Luo

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Working Paper

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Yang-Ming Chang

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This paper presents a conflict model in which the proportion of non-military, consumable resources destroyed by war is an endogenous function of military weapons. Contrary to some findings in the literature, we find that guns optimally produced by contending parties under a peaceful settlement in the shadow of conflict exceed the optimal amounts of guns the parties produce when they go to war. As each party¡¦s payoff from settlement is shown to be larger than its expected payoff from war, the ¡§overproduction¡¨ of guns under settlement is Pareto improving when war destruction is positively and significantly related to military weapons. These findings indicate that, under the shadow of conflict, increasing armaments are not inconsistent with settling disputes peacefully as the former generates an effective deterrence for achieving ¡§armed peace.¡¨

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