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R&D policies, trade and |
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Jan I. Haaland Hans Jarle Kind |
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Journal of International Economics 2008 Vol.74 170-187 |
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This paper set up a simple model with two countries hosting one firm
each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may
grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. This paper has two main
purposes. One is to explore the relationship between trade costs and R&D
investments. They show that increased integration (lower trade cost) may
increase incentives to invest in R&D, and may lead firms to sell more
both domestically and abroad even absence of strategic interaction (local
monopoly). The other is study the effects of policy competition and corporation
in the international market sand to show that R&D subsidies may reduce
the number of product varieties in the market. They show that The policy
competition does not necessary result in too high subsidies; it may lead to
unstable or asymmetric equilibria. The determining factor in the model is
degree of product differentiation. If firms produce imperfect
substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the
firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy
competition and ensures symmetric outcome. However, they show that
harmonization is not necessary welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated
policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one
the firms. |
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