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R&D policies, trade and
 process innovation

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Jan I. Haaland

Hans Jarle Kind

 

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Journal of International Economics 2008 Vol.74 170-187

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This paper set up a simple model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. This paper has two main purposes. One is to explore the relationship between trade costs and R&D investments. They show that increased integration (lower trade cost) may increase incentives to invest in R&D, and may lead firms to sell more both domestically and abroad even absence of strategic interaction (local monopoly). The other is study the effects of policy competition and corporation in the international market sand to show that R&D subsidies may reduce the number of product varieties in the market. They show that The policy competition does not necessary result in too high subsidies; it may lead to unstable or asymmetric equilibria. The determining factor in the model is degree of product differentiation.

If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures symmetric outcome. However, they show that harmonization is not necessary welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one the firms.

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