研討日期

2009年3月7日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   電化教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Fee versus Royalty Licensing in Bertrand Competition in the Presence of Trade Barriers

Ching-Chih Tseng

Wen-Jung Liang

Working Paper

報告人

曾靜枝

參加人員

黃鴻 梁文榮 馬道 陳瑀屏 李朝功 吳芝文 張瑞雲 王佳琪 周品旭 張民忠 陳金盛 周冰瑤 林晏如 吳宜謙 許竹筌 曾靜枝 鍾嘒陵 謝宜真 彭正浩 蔡明芳 丁虹仁 涂光億

論文提要

This paper has developed a barbell model to take into account trade barriers in exploring the outside patentee’s optimal licensing policy under Bertrand competition with homogenous product. Four different contracts, royalty and fixed-fee with exclusive or non-exclusive licensing, are taken into consideration. It has been shown that the patentee’s optimal licensing contract depends upon the degree of trade barriers. The focus of the paper is on the local monopoly rent generated by trade barriers. The higher the degree of trade barriers are, the higher will be the local monopoly rent leading to the possibility that fixed-fee licensing is superior to royalty licensing under Bertrand competition, as the degree of trade barriers are high. Several striking results are derived as follows.

First of all, early literature shows that fixed-fee licensing would never superior to royalty licensing for the outside patentee under Bertrand competition. In contrast, by introducing trade barriers, we show that fixed-fee licensing could be superior to royalty licensing for the outside patentee under Bertrand competition, as the degree of trade barriers are high enough irrespective of drastic or non-drastic innovation.

Secondly, early literature shows that the outside patentee always license to one firm under Bertrand competition as the patentee engages in fixed-fee licensing. However, we show in the paper that the outside patentee would license to both firms as the degree of innovation is non-drastic. In addition, as the degree of innovation is drastic, we prove that the outside patentee would license to both firms if the degree of trade barriers are high.

研究建議