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論文提要
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By adding an upstream firm
to the Cournot model a
la Hwang
and Mai (1988), the paper examines the issue of tariffs and quotas
equivalence under two different pricing strategies by the upstream firm
which includes two-part tariff and monopolistic pricing. We find that the
market price for the final good under a tariff is higher (lower) than that
under the equivalent quota (i.e., the quota is set at the level
of import under the tariff), if the upstream firm adopts two-part tariff
pricing (monopolistic pricing).
This result is in sharp contrast to the finding of Hwang and Mai (1988) and
Fung (1989). We also compare the social welfare under free trade and that
under the equivalent quota (i.e.,
the quota is set at the level of import under free trade).
Surprisingly, the social welfare under free trade is necessarily
lower than that under the equivalent quota. In addition to the case of
two-part tariffs, we also study the cases in which the upstream firm adopts
monopolistic pricing. The effect of the degree of product heterogeneity on
the equivalence is also explored under the two price schemes
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