研討日期

2009年2月21日10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院電化教室

題目

The relevance of bargaining for the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation

作者

Jose J. Sempere Monerris and Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

文獻出處

Bulletin of Economic Research 53(2), 2001,101-115

報告人

周冰瑤

參加人員

黃鴻、林燕淑、鍾嚖陵、梁文榮、張民忠、丁虹仁、張瑋婷、馬道、陳瑀屏、戴璽庭、蔡明芳、林大鈞、李朝功、曾靜枝、許竹筌、陳金盛、許素華、高國峯、陳玉晏、彭正浩、王羿傑、王佳琪、涂光億、周品旭、周冰瑤、王光正、陳宏易

摘要

In the context of a Cournot duopoly, this paper studies the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by means of three possible allocation mechanisms: auction, fixed fee, and direct negotiation.

    The main result for this paper is that, once the use of an arbitrary reserve price has been excluded, it is no longer true that auction always yields higher profit to the patentee than a fixed fee. Direct negotiation is superior to both an auction with a non-arbitrary reserve price and a fixed fee. From the social point of view, however, a public agency maximizing either the domestic or the world welfare will recommend licensing through the fixed fee mechanism. Furthermore, the paper main results are qualitatively robust to an alternative specification where the selling of one license bring to the buyer not only advantages in terms of cost but also the advantage of becoming the Stackelberg leader in the market.

備註