研討日期	2020年8月31日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Non-Discriminatory Pricing, Partial Backward Ownership, and Entry Deterrence
作者 Authors of the paper	Matthias Hunold
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization 70 (2020) 102615
主講人	王佳琪
參加人員	王佳琪、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、林虢楙、洪珮瑜、許雅媚、周宗翰、陳彥勳、Bui Dang Long、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This article demonstrates that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters entry. The supplier benefits from an obligation or a commitment to supply the customers under equal terms, as this induces profitable sales of ownership stakes to incumbent downstream firms.