研討日期	2020年8月3日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The Leverage Effect of Bundling on Monopoly Power and Product Quality
作者 Authors of the paper	Hui-Ling Chung, Jin-Li Hu, Yan-Shu Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	鍾暳陵
參加人員	鍾暳陵、王光正、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、洪珮瑜、許雅媚、林虢楙、周宗翰、陳彥勳、Bui Dang Long、Dong Van Chung、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper analyzes effects of bundling on the competitor’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare when the bundler is a high- or low-quality firm, facing a single product competitor. When the bundling firm produces the high- (low-) quality competing product, bundling is (is not) a preferred strategy. However, when bundling enables the bundler to reverse its quality, bundling becomes a preferred strategy. Independent of the bundler’s quality of competing good, bundling reinforces the monopolist’s market power toward the monopoly good, which is reverse from the traditional leverage effect where bundling extends its monopoly power from the monopoly good market to the competing good market. When the bundling firm is the high-quality firm, bundling always reduces the consumer surplus and increases the competitor’s profit and social welfare. On the other hand, when the bundler is the low-quality firm, bundling enables the bundler to revert its quality level. If the quality difference in competing goods is sufficiently small (large), then bundling increases (reduces) the competitor’s profit and social welfare while decreases (increases) the consumer surplus.