研討日期

2007年10月20日上午10:10 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大法商學院法二教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

 Vertical agglomeration with vertical differentiation

Wen-Jung Liang

Ching-Chih Tseng

Kuang-Cheng Wang

Working paper

報告人

曾靜枝

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、楊雅博、吳世傑、林燕淑、陳宏易、吳芝文、王光正、張民忠、蔡明芳、彭正浩、高國峰、林晏如、曾靜枝、涂光億、周冰瑤、王佳琪。

討論提要

The purpose of this paper is to examine under which conditions the Principle of Minimum Differentiation can be restored, in which the firms’ quality levels (vertical differentiation) are exogenously given.

The game in question is a two-stage game, in which firms select their optimal locations to maximize their profits, respectively, in the first stage, and then play Bertrand competition in the commodity market in the second stage, given firms’ quality levels. Three regimes of pricing policies, discriminatory, uniform delivered and mill pricing, are taken into consideration by firms while competing in the commodity market.

結論

It shows that firms’ location decisions depend on two countervailing effects: the centrifugal competition effect and the centripetal cost-saving effect. The focus of this paper is on the impact of vertical differentiation to firms’ location decision via affecting the competition effect. This paper shows that the higher the degree of vertical differentiation, the weaker the competition effect will be. This creates the possibility of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. However, the Principle of Maximum Differentiation can never arise.

延伸研究

在 two-dimensional framework 的架構之下，討論 IO 中只討論 one-dimensional 的議題，分析垂直異質特性的作用。

備註