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研討日期 |
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研討地點 |
台大社會科學院第二教室 |
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討論文獻 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
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Decision Making on
Strategic Environmental Technology Licensing: Fixed Fee and Royalty Fee |
MING-CHUNG CHANG JIN-LI HU GWO-HSHIUNG TZENG |
Working Paper |
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報告人 |
張民忠 |
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參加人員 |
梁文榮、楊雅博、陳宏易、吳芝文、彭正浩、蔡明芳、林晏如、高國峰、王佳琪、周冰瑤、林冠谷、張民忠 |
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論文提要 |
Because of
the deterioration in the quality of the environment, this paper studies the
effects of the environment and the economy on environmental technology
licensing in a homogeneous Cournot duopoly model in
order to reduce the environmental pollution and seek the optimal social
welfare. To this end, two
licensing methods, namely, a fixed-fee licensing method and a royalty
licensing method are compared. It
is found that a high emission tax rate induces the innovator to not license
the environmental technology to the licensee under the fixed-fee licensing
method. As for the social
welfare, a large innovation scale of environmental technology does not
guarantee that social welfare will be maximized. Finally, a large innovation scale of
environmental technology is likely to increase the consumer’s surplus if the
marginal environmental damage is significant. The consumers are likely to prefer
royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing. This conclusion differs from Wang’s
finding in 2002. |
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研究建議 |
(1)
階段設計中，第二階段與第三階段對調，會得到不同的結果。 (2)
文章中，在Royalty的授權方式下，因為Licensor選擇一個最適的royalty rate，導致市場結構變成獨占，降低文章的有趣性。然而獨占結果的產生，是階段設計所導致。 (3)
參數l，不是marginal environmental damage，而是environmental damage coefficient。 (4)
文中關於比較靜態分析(¶tR/¶e < 0)，應從社會的邊際利益與社會的邊際傷害的角度解釋。 (5)
本文屬環境的文章，所以IO的議題應減少，增加環境方面的討論。 |
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備註 |
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