研討日期

2007年9月15日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00

研討地點

東吳大學城中校區  2419教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Compatibility Strategies for an Asymmetric Duopoly Considering Network Effects and the Cost of Compatibility

曾繁鎮

manuscript

報告人

曾繁鎮

參加人員

林燕淑；陳宏易; 施姵全; 王光正; 王佳琪; 吳世傑; 林晏如; 高國峰; 張民忠; 曾靜枝; 蔡明芳； 涂光億

討論提要

This study, therefore, aims to derive the rules on choosing between compatibility and incompatibility strategies for firms to obtain the most profitable results.  This study finds that (1) firms’ profits increase with their potential customer bases and the consumers’ switching costs, but decrease with the strength of network effects, (2) when the compatibility cost is sufficiently small, the most profitable situation is mutual compatibility, and choosing compatibility is always more desirable than incompatibility, (3) when the compatibility cost is sufficiently large, the most profitable situation is one-way incompatibility, and choosing incompatibility is always more desirable than compatibility, and (4) when network effects are stronger and potential customer bases are closer in sizes, firms are more likely to choose compatibility strategies.

結論

The major contributions of this study are (1) evaluating the profitability of various compatibility situations, (2) providing guidelines for compatibility strategies in light of network effects and the cost of compatibility, and (3) extending the theoretical framework of undercut-proof equilibrium for practical applications.

延伸研究

備註