|
研討日期 |
|
|||
|
研討地點 |
台灣大學社會科學院 第一會議室 |
|||
|
討論題目 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
|
|
1.
Mixed
Oligopoly in Output Competition 2.
Strategic
Semi-Public Joint Venture by the Multinational Firm 3.
Competition
among Local Governments—Excess Entry of Local Public Firms |
Kazuharu Kiyono |
manuscript |
||
|
報告人 |
Kazuharu
Kiyono |
|||
|
參加人員 |
林燕淑；施冠宇; 施姵全; 彭正浩; 王佳琪; 吳世傑; 陳宏易; 依珊;
林晏如; 高國峰; 張民忠; 曾靜枝; 楊雅博; 蔡明芳 |
|||
|
討論提要 |
In this speech, Kaz
integrates three papers in a model and tries to review the results using more
general models, and elucidates how the results depend on whether the
government optimizes with respect to domestic subsidies the degree of
socialization of semi-public firms or import tariffs. Moreover, he explores
how there works such a strategic incentive to create a semi-public
joint-venture firm not only for the foreign firms but also for the host
country. Finally, he discusses “Does the free competition among the local
government firms realize the higher welfare than under the full privatization
of the economy as a whole?” |
|||
|
結論 |
He has explored that when the weight of the
total welfare including the consumer surplus is given property in objective
function of the partially privatized firm, the partially privatized firm can
commit to the greater output and earns the larger profit than a totally privatized
one; has established that the excess entry theorem for private firms also
stands for local public firm. |
|||
|
延伸研究 |
1. Consider some bargaining between
the investors and discuss the output decision as the bargaining outcome where
the disagreement outcome is given by the state in which there is no inward
direct investment. 2. He tried to extend the result to
international setting in which each country deliberately chooses to set up
the own indigenous industries in perfect competition using taxes and
subsidies. |
|||
|
備註 |
|
|
|
|