研討日期

2007年8月4日上午10:10 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大法商學院法二教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Tariff and quota equivalence under vertically related market

Cheng-Hau  Peng

Working paper

報告人

彭正浩

參加人員

梁文榮、楊雅博、吳世傑、林燕淑、陳宏易、吳芝文、王光正、張民忠、蔡明芳、彭正浩、高國峰、林晏如、曾靜枝、涂光億、周冰瑤、王佳琪。

討論提要

This paper extends Hwang and Mai (1988) on the issue of tariffs and quotas equivalence under Cournot model by adding an upstream firm to the analysis. We explore three different pricing strategies used by the upstream firm: two-part tariff, discriminating pricing and uniform pricing. The major findings are: (1) The input price under quota is lower than that under tariff if the upstream firm takes two-part tariff. (2) In the contrary, the input price under quota is higher than the input price under tariff if the upstream firm takes discriminating pricing and uniform pricing. (3) The social welfare of the home country is higher under quotas than under tariffs when the upstream firm takes two part tariff. (4) The social welfare of the home country is lower under quota than under tariff when the upstream firm takes discriminating pricing or uniform pricing. (5) The social welfare of the home country is lower (higher) under discriminating pricing than under uniform pricing if the domestic market is larger (smaller) than the foreign one regardless of the market is under quota or free trade. (6) Most of all, with an upstream firm, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, mentioned by Hwang and Mai (1998), no longer holds.

結論

This paper extends Hwang and Mai (1988) on the issue of tariffs and quotas equivalence under Cournot model by adding an upstream firm to the analysis. By assuming linear and symmetric demand, we establish three countries and three firms model with an upstream firm which sells inputs to two downstream firms in order to evaluate whether the tariffs and the quotas are equivalent. This paper explores three different pricing strategies used by the upstream firm: two-part tariff, discriminating pricing and uniform pricing.

The major findings are: (1) The input price under quota is lower than that under free trade if the upstream firm takes two-part tariff. (2) In the contrary, the input price under quota is higher than the input price under free trade if the upstream firm takes discriminating pricing and uniform pricing. (3) With an upstream firm, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, mentioned by Hwang and Mai(1998), no longer hold.

We also investigate the welfare of the home country and yield: (1) The social welfare of the home country is higher under quota than under free trade when the upstream firm takes two part tariff. (2) The social welfare of the home country is lower under quota than under free trade when the upstream firm takes discriminating pricing or uniform pricing. (3) Whether the social welfare of the home country is equal, lower or higher under discriminating pricing than under uniform pricing depends on the relative size of the home market no matter the market is under quota or tariff.

In sum, this paper has employed a model of intra-industry trade with vertical related market to deal with the classical issue of trade, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas. And we find that the existence of the upstream industry is crucial in evaluating this issue. Therefore, the assumption of horizontal market structure, which is popular in industry organization and trade literature when evaluating government policies, should be used with caution.

延伸研究

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