研討日期

2007年5月19日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00

研討地點

台灣大學  法二教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Spatial price discrimination and the merger paradox

R. Rothschild

John S. Heywood

Kristen Monaco

Regional Science and Urban Economics (2000)

報告人

曾靜枝

參加人員

梁文榮；陳宏易; 楊雅博; 吳世傑; 王光正；張民忠; 彭正浩; 王佳琪; 涂光億；曾靜枝; 蔡明芳; 李玫郁；施姵全;

討論提要

This paper examines the question within the context of a model of spatial competition in which firms choose their locations in anticipation of forming a merger, and practice price-discrimination.

結論

First, on one criterion of welfare (viz transport costs), all merger, irrespective of the distribution of benefits between the firms involved, reduces social welfare. We have also been able to show that the magnitude of the effect on welfare does depend upon the precise distribution of these benefits.

Second, our results show that when merger is individually rational, the gains to the participants exceed that of the excluded firm.

Third, with or without merger, the ‘middle’ firm (L2) obtains lower profits than does the potentially excluded rival. Moreover, as the share of L1 in the gain from merger increases, all firms move rightwards, and consequently the profits of both L2 and the excluded rival fall.

Fourth, there exists a wide range of α for which merger is individually rational (that is, [0.34,0.89], approximately). Yet, only a small part of this range ([0.87,0.89], approximately) is associated with harm to the excluded rival. 

Fifth, when merger does not occur with certainty (that is, when 1>ρ≥0) the profits of the three firms can be shown to reflect the impact of changes in α, given ρ, and changes in ρ, given α.

延伸研究

備註