研討日期

2006年12月2日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

On the Licensing of Innovation under Strategic Delegation

Rod Falvey, Sarut Wittayarungruangsri

European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 771– 786

報告人

彭正浩

參加人員

梁文榮、林燕淑、曾靜枝、李依珊、蔡明芳、彭正浩、張民忠、李玫郁、林晏如、王光正

討論提要

This paper considers the incentives that the existence of an Antidumping Law provides for strategic behaviour on the part of duopolistic firms selling in each other’s segmented markets. Firms have identical costs, but are located in countries with different market sizes (maximum willingness to pay). In free trade the firm from the larger market dumps in the other market, providing incentives for both firms to manipulate their sales in the two markets to influence any future antidumping duty.

結論

This study shows that for small (large) differences in market size, the dumping (other) firm’s strategic actions dominate, and the dumping margin is reduced (increased) relative to free trade. We also consider a price undertaking as an alternative to the duty, and show that the outcome depends on which firms have input into the policy choice.

備註