研討日期

2006年8月19日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Fiscal competition and regional differentiation

Justman, Thisse, and Ypersele

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2005, 35, 848-861

報告人

吳世傑

參加人員

黃鴻、吳世傑、彭正浩、高國峰、李玫郁、林晏如、陳盈秀、曾靜枝、胡均立、邱郁琇、周冰瑤

討論提要

The competitive supply of infrastructure and investment subsidies can become a trap in which regions sink excessive resources that outweigh the gains they are able to realize from new investment. This paper analyzes a formal model of horizontal differentiation of infrastructure. It adopted a three-stage game:

Stage 1. region chooses its type of infrastructure

Stage 2. region sets the subsidy or fee

Stage 3. firms decides in which region to locate and how much output to produce

The two polar cases of full and incomplete information are discussed.

結論

1.          Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated.

2.          In the two polar cases of full and incomplete information, both share regional differentiation in common. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter.

3.          Comparing the two information regimes, we find that the uniform subsidy offered by each region under incomplete information, γwl*－β, is lower than the subsidy either region offers under complete information, γwl*－β/ 2 .  Two reasons: (i) competition with uniform subsidies is less fierce than competition with firm-specific subsidies, (ii) competition under uniform subsidies yields more differentiation between regional infrastructures.

4.          Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulations.

延伸研究

This topic can be extended deeply either in vertical or horizontal product differentiation model, even in an integrated one.

備註