研討日期

2006年2月18日上午10:00 ~下午1:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院綜合大樓研七教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Investment in Public Infrastructure and Tax Competition between Contiguous Regions

C. Dembour and X. Wauthy

Working paper 

報告人

吳世傑

參加人員

林燕淑、王胤杰、黃鴻、王光正、吳世傑、許淑瑛、曾靜枝、李玫郁、李家銘 、林晏如、高國峰、張民忠、彭正浩、周冰瑤、梁文榮、楊雅博、吳芝文

討論提要

Two contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastructure levels in a first stage, then compete in tax. Comparing the properties of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in this stage-game, the authors derive some implications regarding the scope for cooperation between the regions.

結論

When the infrastructure has the attribute of a public good, reaching the efficient level from the point of view of regions (i.e. the minimum level ensuring that all firms move to the country, given the ensuing tax game) may result from equilibrium behavior. By contrast, regions will overinvest in infrastrurture in a SPE  in the case of a private good infrastructure, unless the level of infrastructure is very high.

延伸研究

利用本篇文章的架構，我們可以討論一國政府為吸引外資應該將其資源用以投資服務型類別的基礎設施，亦或製造業類型的基礎設施。

備註