研討日期

2006年2月4日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二會議室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Strategic delegation of environmental policy making

H. Roelfsema

Working paper

報告人

許淑媖

參加人員

林燕淑、王胤杰、黃鴻、王光正、吳世傑、許淑瑛、曾靜枝、李玫郁、李家銘 、林晏如、高國峰、張民忠、彭正浩、周冰瑤

討論提要

A common claim is that nations should cooperate in environmental policy making. However, there is little empirical support that non-cooperative decision making results in too low environmental standards and taxes.

結論

This paper develops a theoretical model and show that if the median voter cares sufficiently for the environment, she has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares more for the environment than she does herself. By doing so, she mitigates the ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental taxes.

延伸研究

The concept generated from this paper can be applied to international trade theory.

備註